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Articles
REGULATORY REFORM IN THE REAGAN ERA
THOMAS 0. MCGARITY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The three great social reform movements of the twentieth cen-
tury-the Progressive movement at the beginning of the twentieth
century; the New Deal of the 1930s; and the Civil Rights/Con-
sumer/Environmental movements of the late 1960s and early
1970s-were social responses to perceived abuses of economic and
political power by private entities. "Fairness," "justice," "equality,"
were dominant themes of these movements. The reforms accom-
plished by these movements are etched in the laws of the land and
institutionalized in regulatory agencies such as the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Food and
Drug Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
Lawyers dominated the process of institutionalizing reforms.
They wrote the laws that empowered the regulatory agencies; they
were often chosen to lead those agencies; and they have dominated
the intricate process of crafting the thousands of rules, regulations,
and guidelines that constitute the vital connective tissue between
the social commands embodied in the reform legislation and the so-
cially desirable conduct of the regulated industries.
* B.A., 1971, Rice University; J.D., 1974, University of Texas. Copper K. Ragan
Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. This Article is a revised version of
the 1984 Lawrence and Pearl Gerber Memorial Lecture delivered at the University of
Maryland School of Law on November 15, 1984. The author would like to express his
appreciation to Mary Sahs, University of Texas Class of 1985, for her research assistance
in its preparation.
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During the late 1970s and early 1980s, we have observed the
stirrings of a social movement of a very different sort. This budding
movement has developed in response to perceived weaknesses in
the regulatory process as it has evolved through the years. Govern-
ment power, not private power, is the concern of these new reform-
ers. "Freedom," "accountability," "efficiency," and "economic
growth" are the dominant themes. The regulatory agencies that
were once the temples of the earlier social reform movements have
become the targets of the modern "regulatory reform" movement.
The regulatory reformers are not for the most part lawyers.
The new movement is dominated by economists and policy analysts.
The new movement is supported not by unions, civil rights groups,
consumer and environmental groups, and other activists, but by
businessmen, state and local officals, and trade associations. These
regulatory reformers have a positive antipathy for lawyers, with their
nitpicking concern for precision in crafting regulatory requirements
and their preoccupation with "enforceability." They hold the view
that incentives, not rules, should guide business conduct and that
negotiation among the principals, not litigation between the law-
yers, should determine disputes. Most importantly, the regulatory
reformers believe that there should be fewer rules and, conse-
quently, fewer lawyers.
What, then, is this social phenomenon that threatens to put so
many attorneys out of work? What is the nature of this reaction
against the institutional embodiment of the earlier social reform
movements? What are the characteristics of this regulatory reform
movement? And how should we react to it?
II. EcONOMIc REGULATION AND SOCIAL REGULATION
A good starting point is the familiar distinction between two
types of regulation-economic regulation and social regulation.'
Economic regulation is concerned with preventing undue economic
concentration, regulating natural monopolies, eliminating economic
windfalls, ensuring adequate distribution of goods and services, and
reducing fraud in economic transactions. Economic regulation
comprised the bulk of the social reforms of the Progressive and New
Deal eras, although there are exceptions such as the Pure Food and
Drug Act. Economic regulation is typically implemented through
"independent" commissions composed of several members who are
1. See, e.g., G. EADS & M. Fix, RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN'S REGULATORY DILEMMA
12 (1984); R. LITAN & W. NORDIIAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 6 (1983).
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not subject to the direct control of the President. These commis-
sions are typically given a broad mandate to regulate "in the public
interest."'2 Revisionist historians have suggested that some of these
agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Federal Maritime Commission, may have been created at the behest
of the regulated industries to protect individual companies from
competition.3 Certainly a case can be made for the proposition that
over time, the economic agencies lost their regulatory fervor and
became captives of the industries that they were charged with
regulating.4
Social regulation, by contrast, is concerned with reducing
health and environmental risks, preserving civil rights and equal op-
portunity, and generally controlling the extent to which one group
of persons enjoys the benefits of a technology or enterprise without
sharing in its costs. Much of the current social regulation arises out
of statutes that were enacted in the early 1970s as a result of the
social ferment of the 1960s.
These newer social regulatory agencies, with some minor ex-
ceptions, are not independent multimember agencies; rather, the
heads of these agencies serve under a cabinet secretary or directly
under the President. The discretion of the social regulatory agen-
cies is often cabined by explicit statutory directives, and it is even
further limited by provisions empowering ordinary citizens to sue
the agency heads to compel them to perform their duties.5
This distinction between economic regulation and social regu-
lation is important for an examination of any regulatory reform ef-
forts because the two types of regulation invoke wholly different
kinds of policy considerations and interest groups. The Reagan Ad-
ministration's regulatory reform efforts have achieved a greater de-
gree of success in the area of economic regulation in part because
the interplay of policy considerations and interest groups has not
generated the same resistance to change in that area as it has in the
area of social regulation. This Article, however, will focus upon so-
cial regulation, in part because the Reagan Administration's efforts
2. See generally G. EADS & M. Fix, supra note 1, at 12-15 (distinguishing between
economic and social regulation); R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 6 (same).
3. See, e.g., G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION (1970) (railroads favored crea-
tion of Interstate Commerce Commission).
4. See, e.g., Green & Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly
Man, 82 YALE LJ. 871 (1973); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1685-88 (1975).
5. See generally G. EADS & M. Fix, supra note 1, at 12-15 (identifying characteristics of
social regulation).
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to implement social regulation have been more controversial and,
therefore, offer more opportunities for insights into the process of
regulatory reform.
III. AN ANATOMY OF REGULATORY REFORM
Given the wide variety of approaches that we have developed
for regulating undesirable social conduct, it should not be surpris-
ing that regulatory reform is not a monolithic notion. The term
"regulatory reform" masks a host of sometimes complementary and
sometimes contradictory notions. Therefore, before examining reg-
ulatory reform in the specific context of the Reagan Administration,
I would like to suggest a simple "taxonomy." The various ap-
proaches to regulatory reform can be divided into five broad catego-
ries: (1) goal-oriented substantive regulatory reform; (2) means-
oriented substantive regulatory reform; (3) structural regulatory re-
form; (4) procedural regulatory reform; and (5) cognitive regulatory
reform. The following discussion will elaborate on these five
categories.
A. Substantive Regulatory Reform
Substantive regulatory reform, which includes both goal-ori-
ented substantive regulatory reform and means-oriented substan-
tive regulatory reform, involves changing the substantive output of
an agency's decisionmaking process. Substantive regulatory reform
can be accomplished directly through changes in the statutes that an
agency administers, or it can come about through changes in the
administration of those statutes. Legislative changes result from the
pulls and tugs of the political process. Administrative changes can be
effected in a number of ways, such as through personnel changes,
direct supervision of upper level decisionmakers, budget cuts, and
failure to enforce existing standards. 6 An agency's discretion to
bring about substantive regulatory reform administratively, how-
ever, is limited by the terms of the statutes that it administers.
1. Goal-Oriented Substantive Regulatory Reform. -Goal-oriented
substantive regulatory reform, as the term implies, is aimed at
changing the long-range goals that an agency seeks to implement.
Since most statutes do not have a single goal, proponents of goal-
oriented substantive regulatory reform frequently urge that the
6. See generally Id. at 163 (noting the Reagan Administration's choice of a primarily
administrative, rather than legislative, approach to regulatory change).
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agency adopt a different mix of its often competing goals. The elec-
tric utility industry, for example, does not maintain that the goal of
the Clean Air Act should no longer be to clean the air. Rather, the
industry maintains that economic progress is also a goal of the Act,
and is one to which the EPA is giving short shrift.
2. Means-Oriented Substantive Regulatory Reform.-Means-ori-
ented substantive regulatory reform does not disturb the agency's
predetermined goals, but focuses upon changes in the vehicles for
attaining those goals. Economists, for example, have long argued
that effluent charges or marketable pollution permits would achieve
the same degree of environmental quality as current technology
based standards at a fraction of the cost.7 Similarly, some regula-
tory reformers have suggested that a lottery or an auction for allo-
cating scarce spots on the radio frequency spectrum would be
greatly preferable to lengthy licensing proceedings, in which an
agency must decide which among many competing candidates will
best serve the "public interest."8 Other regulatory methods include
voluntary standard-setting by trade associations or other private en-
tities, and standard-setting through negotiations among the affected
parties.9
B. Structural Regulatory Reform
Structural regulatory reform involves altering agency decision-
making structures so that different institutional actors play greater or
lesser roles. Structural regulatory reformers stress the concept of
"accountability." One example of structural regulatory reform
would be a proposal to convert an "independent" agency into an
executive agency. Independent agencies are less accountable to the
President because their members cannot be hired and fired at will.
Agencies already within the executive departments can be made
more accountable to the White House through mechanisms for ex-
ecutive review. If, for example, the agency rulemaking process is
sructured in a way that requires White House sign-off before the
7. See, e.g., STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 2D
SESs., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION (Appendix to volume VI, FRAMEWORK FOR REGU-
LATION) 251 (Comm. Print 1978) (L. RUFF, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION); F.
ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR, ENVIRONMENTAL. IMPROVE-
MENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1977); Stewart, Economics. Environment, and The
Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENV'L. L. REV. 1 (1985).
8. See, e.g., Wines, FCC Discovers That Carving Q ) The Spectrnim Isn't Wl'hat It Used To Be,
16 NAT'LJ. 983, 986-87 (1984).
9. See, e.g., Harter, Vegotiating Regulations: .1 Cnrefor .1alaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982).
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agency may propose a rule, White House officials as a practical mat-
ter can achieve a greater degree of policy input than they could were
they relegated to the status of an equal participant in the rulemaking
process.
Similarly, structuring the process so that either Congress or a
congressional committee has veto power over agency rulemaking
can enhance agency accountability to Congress.' Even in the ab-
sence of a direct veto, Congress and its committees can still enforce
agency accountability through legislative oversight and active in-
volvement in the appropriations process. In either case, by holding
the agencies to account, members of Congress expand their influ-
ence over the agencies' substantive output.
Judicial review is another vehicle for structuring accountability
into the agency decisionmaking process. Judicial review ensures
agency fidelity to the terms of its statutory commands and forces the
agency to measure its actions against indicia of the public interest
that are not overtly political. In addition, judicial review requires
the agency to lay a factual predicate for its actions or to explain why
prudent public policy must substitute for facts when the state of sci-
entific or economic knowledge is too uncertain to support hard find-
ings of fact. Judicial review, therefore, is a way of holding an agency
accountable not to a particular institution, but to an ideal of struc-
tured, rational thought.
A final vehicle for structuring accountability into the agency
decisionmaking process is direct public participation in that process.
Allowing representatives from all potentially affected constituencies
to participate in an open decisionmaking process helps ensure that
all relevant points of view are considered and enhances public ac-
ceptance of the outcome.
These four devices for enhancing structural accountability can,
of course, conflict with one another. For example, a conservative
10. The Supreme Court has declared the pure legislative veto unconstitutional. Im-
migration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Other devices for
legislative control, however, do exist and are frequently implemented. See LEVINSON,
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: OPTIONS AVAILABLE AFTER
CHADHA, DRAFT REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
(Dec. 1, 1983), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LEGISLA-
TIVE VETO OF AGING RULES AFTER INS v. CHADHA, TWENTY-SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION,
Appendix B (1984) (discussion on Dec. 15, 1983); Breyer, The Legislative Veto After
Chadha, 72 GEO. L. J. 785, 792-96 (1983); Granat, Legislative Veto Replacements Considered,
41 CONG. Q. 1501 (1983); Kaiser, Congressional Control of Executive Actions in the Aftermath of
the Chadha Decision, 36 AD. L. REV. 239 (1984).
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President may not want the executive agencies to be more accounta-
ble to a liberal Congress, and vice versa. Similarly, enhanced judi-
cial review may frustrate the political agenda of either the President
or the Congress, and full public participation can hamper the be-
hind-the-scenes activity that enables congressional and executive ac-
tors to have a substantive impact on an agency's output.
C. Procedural Regulatory Reform
Suggestions for procedural regulatory reform fall generally into
two categories. Many regulatory reformers would have us (1) re-
duce the extensive information requirements that agencies place
upon regulated entities, and (2) simplify the often convoluted and
costly procedures that impede administrative decisionmaking.
Although information is the lifeblood of a regulatory agency-
and the primary source of any agency's information is the regulated
industry itself-furnishing an agency with vital statistical informa-
tion often results in burdensome paperwork requirements on the
regulated companies. The regulatory reform issue here is not
whether the regulated industry should be required to provide infor-
mation to the agencies; rather, it is whether the marginal value of a
particular informational requirement exceeds its marginal cost to
the industry.
Similarly, while the purpose of administrative procedures is to
foster a sense of fair treatment in both the regulated industry and
the public, procedural protections can also cause, and even invite,
costly delay. The issue is whether devices for greasing the proce-
dural skids can be found that do not unduly impede the legitimate
expectations of all affected parties to have a fair opportunity for in-
put into the decisionmaking process.
Like structural accountability devices, procedural reforms can
have an important impact upon the agency's substantive output.
Cutting off an agency's information flow can leave it "at sea" with
no sense of direction. Conversely, providing more information to
an agency can incite it to action. Thus, manipulating administrative
procedures can frustrate an active agency or stimulate a moribund
one. As Congressman Dingell has aptly put it, "I'll let you write the
substance on a statute and you let me write the procedure, and I'll
screw you every time."'"
11. Regulatory Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., I st Sess. 312
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Hall Hearings].
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D. Cognitive Regulatory Reform
According to many prominent regulatory reformers, the prob-
lem with regulation is that it is not sufficiently analytical. 2 The
agency's thinking process is constantly muddled. Agencies do not
establish clear goals and priorities and measure their everyday deci-
sions against those overarching considerations. Because agencies
do not ask the right questions, their information-gathering efforts
are often wasted. They do not process the information that they do
have adequately by using all available quantitative techniques, and
they do not structure the regulatory issues in ways that are meaning-
ful to the decisionmaker. Most importantly, agencies do not think
rationally. Extraneous political considerations cloud clearheaded
policy analysis. According to these reformers, agencies must change
the way that they address regulatory problems. The answer is a
greater reliance upon the budding art of "regulatory analysis."
Many cognitive regulatory reformers are economists and gradu-
ates of schools of public policy. The brand of analysis that they ad-
vocate is not unlike the "legal analysis" that law professors attempt
to pound into first-year law students. Problems are broken down
into their constituent parts and analyzed. Alternative solutions to
the problems are identified, and the policy implications of the op-
tions are carefully scrutinized. An acceptable solution is ultimately
arrived at and explained. However, cognitive regulatory reformers
would add to this thinking process a healthy dose of quantitative
analysis. Rather than analyzing the broad "pros" and "cons" of al-
ternative regulatory approaches, cognitive regulatory reformers
would have the agencies quantify their "costs" and "benefits" and
thereby, in the minds of some critics, eliminate from the equation
unquantifiable variables such as "justice" and "fairness."' 3
IV. REGULATORY REFORM AT THE OUTSET OF THE REAGAN ERA
Having established an analytical framework for comprehending
the wide variety of ideas that fall under the umbrella of "regulatory
12. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 305, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1981); R. CRANDALL & L.
LAVE, INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY IN THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REG-
ULATION 1-17 (1981); L. LAVE, QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT IN REGULATION (1982).
13. See, e.g., McGarity, ledia Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for
Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 179-91 (1983);
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329,
1361-65 (1971).
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reform," it is now possible to examine and evaluate the Reagan Ad-
ministration's regulatory reform efforts in a more thoughtful man-
ner. While the following description is by no means intended to be
a comprehensive description of those efforts, it should convey the
flavor of the major thrusts of the Reagan Administration in the area
of regulatory reform.
At the outset of the Reagan Administration, regulatory reform
had an extremely high priority. President Reagan made "regulatory
relief" one of the four "cornerstones" of his "economic recovery
program."' 4 He created a highly visible Presidential Task Force on
Regulatory Relief, which was charged with coordinating the Admin-
istration's regulatory reform efforts.' 5 The Task Force was also
charged with resolving interagency disputes as they arose in the
context of particular rulemaking initiatives.
The primary focus of the Reagan Administration's early efforts
at "regulatory relief" was goal-oriented substantive regulatory re-
form of social regulation. Rather than recasting regulation in order
to make it more efficient and effective, the Reagan Administration at
first attempted simply to eliminate it.16 Indeed, a convincing case
can be made that the Reagan Administration, at the outset, intended
to use every regulatory reform tool available to it in a single-minded
effort to change the regulatory goals mandated by Congress during
earlier periods of social reform to parallel more closely the needs
and desires of the regulated industries.17
14. See Office of the White House Press Secretary, Summary Fact Sheet, The Presi-
dent's Economic Recovery Program and Regulatory Relief (June 6, 1981), reprinted in
MATERIALS ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROGRAM OF REGULATORY RELIEF, (undated) (avail-
able at the General Accounting Office Library) [hereinafter cited as REGULATORY RELIEF
MATERIALS].
15. Remarks by President Reagan (Jan. 22, 1981), reprinted in REGULATORY RELIEF
MATERIALS, supra note 14, at 37.
16. See Viscusi, Presidential Oversight, 2J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 157, 160-63 (1983).
See generallyJ. LASH, K. GILLMAN, & D. SHERIDAN, A SEASON OF SPOILS (1984) (discussing
early Reagan environmental regulation reform strategies) [hereinafter cited as A SEASON
OF SPOILS]. James C. Miller, Administrator for Information and Regulatory Affairs, Of-
fice of Management and Budget, testified, "As the Vice President has indicated, the
charge given his task force is not to study regulation or study ways of reforming regula-
tion, but to provide regulatory relief." Regulator Reform Legislation of 1981: Hearings on S.
344 and S. 1080 Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1981). At least one of the earlier reformers later regretted the use of the term "relief'
instead of the term "reform." Weidenbaum, Regulatoi
, 
Reform Under the Reagan Adminis-
tration, in THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY: AN ASSESSMENT 15, 17 (G. Eads & M. Fix
eds. 1984).
17. See, e.g., J. CLAYBROOK, RETREAT FROM SAFETY: REAGAN'S ATTACK ON AMERICA'S
HEALTH (1984); M. PERTSCHUCK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION (1982); S. TOLCHIN & T.
TOLCtIIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE RUSHl TO DEREGULATE (1983).
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A. Goal-Oriented Substantive Regulatory Reform
The Administration "hit the ground running" with its "regula-
tory relief" efforts. It placed at the head of the important social
regulatory agencies hard core but inexperienced "regulatory reliev-
ers." Although ideologically committed to rolling back regulatory
burdens, these appointees were, with a few important exceptions,
unaware of or uninfluenced by the historical context of the institu-
tions that they were appointed to lead. Some were unsympathetic to
the earlier social movements that resulted in the creation of their
agencies. Many were distrustful of their career staffs. They were
aloof, politically unsophisticated, and to a surprising degree unqual-
ified to perform their statutory responsibilities.' 8
The budgets of all the important social regulatory agencies
were cut severely in the first Reagan budget.' 9 While this budget-
cutting was part of an overall effort to reduce government spending,
it is clear that the Administration had a second agenda. An early
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) briefing package boasted
that "fewer regulators will necessarily result in fewer regulations
and less harassment of the regulated."2 This prediction became
reality when several of the major regulatory agencies went virtually
moribund as they attempted to absorb severe budget cuts during
the first two years of the Administration.2
Many of the social regulatory agencies also cut back severely on
their efforts to enforce regulations that were currently on the
books.2 2 At times, agencies were so confident that a particular rule
would soon be amended that they would decline to enforce it during
the rulemaking process.2" This approach, however, exposed the
agencies to charges that they had prejudged the outcomes of future
rulemaking efforts and that they were failing in their duty to enforce
18. See G. EADS & M. Fix, supra note 1, at 145 (Reagan Administration appointed
personnel "with surprisingly little experience in the technical fields regulated by their
agencies or offices").
19. See id. at 148-55; NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, SHREDDING THE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL SAFETY NET: THE FULL STORY BEHIND THE EPA BUDGET CUTS (1982); Shabecoff,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Making Deep Staffing Cuts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1982, at
20, col. 1.
20. Clark, Regulatory Agencies Get Double Vhammy in Reagan Budget Cuts, 13 NAT'LJ. 475
(1981) (discussing President Reagan's February 18 "economic recovery" message).
21. See FRIENDS OF THE EARTH et al., RONALD REAGAN AND THE ENVIRONMENT 5-37
(1982). See generally R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 127-31 (offering statistical
comparisons to show severity of budget cuts).
22. See generally G. EADS & M. Fix, supra note 1, at 191-206 (discussing new enforce-
ment policies and practices under the Reagan Administration).
23. See A SEASON OF SPOILS, supra note 16.
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the law. At other times, the agencies would explain that they pre-
ferred the less adversarial approach of working with regulated in-
dustries to solve their problems.24 This approach resulted in
complaints that the agencies were "coddling" lawbreakers. 25
Viewed broadly across many agencies, it became increasingly appar-
ent that some were attempting to alter their administrative goals
through the exercise of their discretion not to enforce rules that had
been adopted in pursuit of goals that the agencies now rejected.
The actions that the agencies did take during those early years
were often deregulatory in nature. The incoming Administration
placed an immediate "freeze" upon the Carter Administration's ill-
conceived "midnight regulations" 26 and a Task Force on Regula-
tory Relief, headed by the Vice President, promulgated several "hit
lists" of other regulations that were especially displeasing to the
regulated industries.27 In particular, the automobile industry was
the target of a special regulatory relief effort: an Auto Industry Task
Force worked with the Presidential Task Force to assemble a list of
changes in existing regulations aimed at reducing regulatory costs
for the industry.28 Moreover, throughout the government agencies
obligingly began to dissemble the existing regulatory fabric by pro-
posing revisions to existing rules and refusing to enforce them while
the revisions were pending.29
Potentially the most significant action during this period was
the signing of an executive order that required agencies to calculate
the costs and benefits of each regulatory option for major rules and
24. See, e.g., Wines, They're Still Telling OSHA Horror Stories, But the "Victims "Are New,
13 NAT'LJ. 1985 (1981).
25. See, e.g., SIERRA CLUB, POISONS ON THE JOB IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND
AMERICAN WORKERS (1982); Russell, Nader Group Study Calls OSHA Too Lax, Washington
Post, Nov. 9, 1982, at A19, col. 5. Sawyer & Early, OSHA Befriends Industry, But Draws New
Fire, Washington Post, July 5, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
26. See White House Memorandum, Postponement of Pending Regulations, reprinted
in REGULATORY RELIEF MATERIALS, supra note 14, at 39; PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON
REGULATORY RELIEF, REAGAN ADMINISTRATION REGULATORY ACHIEVEMENTS 2 (Aug. 11,
1983) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT, Aug. 1983].
27. During 1981 and 1982, the Task Force on Regulatory Relief designated a total of
119 rules and regulations for agency reconsideration. TASK FORCE REPORT, Aug. 1983,
supra note 26, at 5. See generally G. FADS & M. FIx, supra note 1, at 118-119 (discussing
broad measures of the activities and influence of the Reagan regulatory oversight
process).
28. See Office of the White House Press Secretary, Summary Fact Sheet, President
Reagan's Program for the U.S. Automobile Industry, reprinted in REGULATORY RELIEF
MATERIALS, supra note 14, at 103.
29. Mayer, U.S. Relaxing Enforcement of Regulations, Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1981, at
Fl, col. 1.
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forbade agencies to adopt an option whose benefits did not exceed
its costs, unless specifically required to do so by statute. 30 The or-
der further required the agency to adopt the most cost-beneficial op-
tion.3 While the new executive order was perhaps more important
as a vehicle for cognitive regulatory reform and, to a more limited
extent, structural regulatory reform, it had the practical effect of vir-
tually guaranteeing a slow-down in the issuance of new social regu-
lations. Deregulatory actions, on the other hand, breezed through
the review process established by the executive order."
Finally, the Administration established a legislative agenda for
regulatory relief.33 At the top of the list was the Clean Air Act.3 4 All
of the major players, both inside and outside the government,
watched the progress of the Administration's Clean Air Act initiative
as a bellwether for how the Administration's other regulatory relief
efforts would fare. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
leadership carefully solicited the input of the regulated industries
and was chary of the advice of the EPA professional staff.35 At the
same time, the Administration encouraged the new Senate Subcom-
mittee on Regulatory Reform to draft an omnibus regulatory reform
act incorporating several prominent reform initiatives into the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, which would make them binding on all
federal regulatory agencies.3 6 Although not directed to any particu-
lar substantive statutory commands, most of the prominent changes
in administrative law featured in the proposed legislation would
have the practical effect of impeding the flow of federal regulations.
30. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
31. Id. at 128 §2(d).
32. Cf. J. CLAYBROOK, supra note 17, at xxv (cost-benefit analysis not applied to pro-
grams favored by business).
33. James C. Miller, Administrator for Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget, testified that the Administration feels strongly that "there is a
need for substantive reform of the organic statutes, that is where the key payoff is going
to be." Regulatory Procedures Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 746 Before the Subcomm. on Admin-
istrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 686 (1981).
34. See Statement by the Vice President Regarding Progress Made in Achieving the
President's Goal of Regulatory Relief (June 6, 1981), reprinted in REGULATORY RELIEF
MATERIALS, supra note 14, at iv.
35. See A SEASON OF SPOILS, supra note 16, at 31-38.
36. See S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 7938 (1981); Statement by the
Vice President Regarding Progress Made in Achieving the President's Goal of Regula-
tory Relief (June 6, 1981), reprinted in REGULATORY RELIEF MATERIALS, supra note 14, at
iii.
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B. Means-Oriented Substantive Regulatory Reform
The early Reagan Administration initiated some modest means-
oriented substantive regulatory reform efforts with respect to social
regulation. EPA successfully expanded the "bubble concept"-al-
lowing increases in emissions from one unit in an existing source so
long as they are offset by reductions from another unit within the
same source-to areas of the country that had failed to attain air
quality standards.37 EPA also established an Office of Regulatory
Reform to explore other market-oriented alternatives to "command
and control" regulations. Agency policy analysts persuaded the
technical staff in the Office of Mobile Sources to allow refineries to
"trade" allowable amounts of lead in gasoline as a method for ame-
liorating the harsh immediate impact of the agency's lead
phasedown rule. 8 The Office of Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) suggested several "performance based" options for its haz-
ard identification standard for warning workers of toxic substances
in the workplace. 3 9 In addition, the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission began to experiment with voluntary standard-setting. 40
None of these relatively modest reforms, however, found its way
into legislation.
C. Structural Regulatory Reform
The Reagan Administration's efforts at structural regulatory re-
form have been devoted almost exclusively to increasing executive
oversight of the executive federal agencies. Executive Order 12,291
required that every proposed and final rule be submitted to OMB
for review, and OMB was empowered to return the rule to the
agency if it found the rule to be inconsistent with the Executive Or-
der.4 ' Through this vehicle, OMB became very active in the
rulemaking process, although the full extent of its participation has
been a matter of some debate. To a much greater extent than in
previous administrations, however, the OMB review role was played
37. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
38. Telephone interview with Robert Weissman, Special Assistant to the Director,
Mobile Source Division, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (Jan. 6, 1984).
39. Hazard Communication Standards, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280, 53,282 (1983) (codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 1910).
40. [Current Report] PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 494-495 (June 26, 1981).
41. Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 31, at 131 §6.
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behind closed doors42 and as a result, beneficiaries of social regula-
tion and the general public could not hold OMB accountable.
Moreover, although agency heads usually won when they cared
enough about an issue to pursue it at higher levels within the Ad-
ministration, OMB undoubtedly had a profound impact upon the
substance of agency rules, if only because of the in terrorem advan-
tage it possessed as the organization that set agency budgets.
The Administration in general adopted a very one-sided ap-
proach toward public participation as an accountability device. Rep-
resentatives of the regulated industries participated in assembling
the Vice Presidential Task Force's "hit list." They were also af-
forded unprecedented access to the decisionmaking process of
many social regulatory agencies. For example, EPA held private
"decision conferences" with representatives of pesticide registrants
to discuss the regulatory actions that the agency should take.43 In
addition, industry critiques of both proposed and final rules were
welcomed at OMB during its review process. On the other hand,
representatives of groups that benefitted from social regulation
were initially excluded from the decisionmaking process. Finally,
the Administration was ambivalent toward enhanced judicial review
of administrative actions and actively opposed the congressional
veto before its somewhat unexpected demise.44
D. Procedural Regulatory Reform
Early in its tenure, the Reagan Administration initiated exten-
sive paperwork reduction efforts,45 and although it can point to
these efforts as one of its "success stories," it has done very little in
the way of simplifying agency procedures. The Administration's
only major effort in this area has been an attempt by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to streamline the procedures for licensing
42. See G. EADS & M. Fix, supra note 1, at 108.
43. Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1981, at All, col. 1.
44. The Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1080 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (1983)
(statement ofJonathan C. Rose, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy). See
also R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 118-19 (discussing alternative proposal to
enhance judicial review of agency decisions).
45. See Wines, The Reagan Regulatory Ax Will Swing More Furiously in 1982, 14 NAT'L.J.,
96, 97 (1982). See also [Current Report] O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 333 (Oct. 16, 1982).
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nuclear power plants. 46 However, this effort has not had a noticea-
ble impact on the speed with which the Commission awards operat-
ing licenses for plants currently under construction. Moreover, it is
unlikely to have an impact on decisions to build new plants because
utility companies will probably not schedule new plant construction
until they are satisfied that they can recover their costs from
consumers.
E. Cognitive Regulatory Reform
Perhaps the most important component of Executive Order
12,291 was its requirement that agencies prepare a regulatory analy-
sis of all "major" rules.47 This requirement has been strictly en-
forced by OMB during the rulemaking review process. Although
the regulatory analysis requirement originated in earlier administra-
tions, the Reagan Administration elevated it to a position of greater
prominence. Moreover, the new Executive Order explicitly re-
quired the agencies to analyze the benefits of their regulations as well
as the costs, and OMB further required that the benefits be reduced
to present value using a very high discount rate of ten percent.48
OMB thus forced agencies to attach monetary values to human mor-
bidity and mortality, and it ensured that measures designed to pro-
tect humans in the distant future would not count for much in the
present cost-benefit calculus.
The agencies quickly began to implement the analytical require-
ments by hiring additional professionals skilled in policy analysis
and contractors with analytical expertise. Indeed, one could call Ex-
ecutive Order 12,291 a "policy analysts full employment act."
As more and more programs began to institutionalize the regu-
latory analysis requirements, analysis became an integral part of the
decisionmaking process in most agencies. Although many Regula-
tory Impact Assessments were no doubt post hoc rationalizations
for decisions reached on other grounds, my examination of the pro-
cess over a two-year period has convinced me that the requirement
has resulted in many genuine efforts to obtain relevant information,
46. See COUNCIL OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES, REGULATORY RELIEF AT THE
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 43 (1982).
47. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128-30 § 3.
48. Office of Management and Budget, Interim Regulatory Impact Analysis Gui-
dance, June 12, 1981, at 4.
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analyze that information, probe alternatives, and reach sound regu-
latory decisions.49 Whether the effort is worth its substantial costs,
however, is open to debate.
V. REACTION AND RETRENCHMENT
The Reagan Administration's regulatory relief efforts had been
underway for barely a year when affected constituencies began to
react. The early "regulatory relief" activities created a strong public
impression that the Administration was placing the narrow eco-
nomic interests of regulatees above the broader "public interest."50
This perception was extremely useful to representatives of benefici-
ary groups as they attempted to stem the tide of regulatory reform.
In the area of social regulation the Administration was beaten back
on almost every front.
The Administration's legislative efforts to achieve goal-oriented
substantive reform of social regulation can only be characterized as
a rout. When environmental groups and sympathetic members of
Congress became aware of the Administration's behind-the-scenes
efforts to redraft the Clean Air Act, they accurately charged that the
Administration was attempting to "gut" the Act.5" The environ-
mental groups then seized control of the political agenda. The draft
amendments were not characterized in the media as regulatory re-
form, or even as regulatory relief for an ailing industry. Rather, they
were painted as an attempt to undo the reforms of the early 1970s,
which, of course, they were. The much-vaunted 1981 Clean Air Act
initiative died aborning.12
The defeat of the Clean Air Act paved the way for further legis-
lative defeats. The Consumer Product Safety Commission escaped
the Administration's attempt to dismantle it and fold its remaining
regulatory functions into the Commerce Department.5" Congress
rejected administration and industry regulatory reforms of the
Clean Water Act5 4 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Ro-
denticide Act.55 And the Omnibus Regulatory Reform Act,56 which
49. See T. McGarity, The Role of Regulatory Analysis in Regulatory Decisionmaking,
Final Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (May 1985).
50. See G. EADS & M. Fix, supra note 1, at 257-58.
51. Inside E.P.A. Weekly Report: An Exclusive Report of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, June 5, 1981, at 4.
52. Id. Nov. 19, 1982, at 3.
53. 41 CONG. Q. 846 (1983) ("House Committee May Reverse CPSC Cuts").
54. [Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 397 (July 23, 1982).
55. 40 CONG. Q 1983-84 (1982) ("Industry Loses Major Points in FIFRA Bill").
56. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 7938 (1981).
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passed the Senate, died in the House, never to rise again.5 7 Inter-
estingly, by late 1983, all of the Administration's documented suc-
cess stories and pending statutory initiatives were in the area of
economic regulation.58
The Administration's administrative efforts at goal-oriented sub-
stantive regulatory reform also collapsed. Its tactic of regulatory-
relief-through-reduced-enforcement generated attacks on the agen-
cies for playing political favorites and for failing to observe the rule
of law. Administrator Gorsuch's leadership at EPA came to an igno-
minious end in a bitter separation of powers dispute between the
Administration and the House of Representatives over enforcement
documents. 59 Long before the end of the first Reagan Administra-
tion, most of the heads of the major social regulatory agencies were
gone. The Vice President's Task Force heeded Senator Leahy's ad-
vice to President Johnson on Vietnam - it declared victory and
went home.6 °
By mid-term, the agency budgets were on their way back up to
Carter Administration levels.6 ' While many of the administrative
regulatory relief efforts were successful, the agencies had reversed
field on several important deregulatory efforts, such as the EPA's
proposal to repeal its regulations phasing lead out of gasoline62 and
OSHA's hazard identification regulations.63
OMB continued to review agency rulemaking, but the agencies
began to place OMB's comments in the public record.64 Several
congressional committees became intensely interested in OMB's
57. See Granat, Rules Committee Fails to Act; Regulatory Reform Stalled, 40 CONG. Q. 3029
(1982).
58. TASK FORCE REPORT, AUG. 1983, supra note 26, at 107-24.
59. A SEASON OF SPOILS, supra note 16, at 73-81.
60. See TASK FORCE REPORT, Aug. 1983, supra note 26.
61. Washington Post, June 3, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
62. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 48 Fed. Reg. 5,724 (1983) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80); Inside E.P.A. Weekly Report: An Exclusive Report of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Jan. 11, 1985, at 9.
63. Hazard Communication Standards, supra note 39.
64. Personal Interview with Joseph A. Cannon, Associate Administrator for Policy
and Resource Management, Environmental Protection Agency, in Washington, D.C.
(May 18, 1983). The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce recommended that OMB and all federal departments
and agencies should require that all written communications involving the review of reg-
ulations under Executive Order 12,291 be made a part of the rulemaking file. STAFF OF
HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE OVER EPA
DOCUMENTS, ABUSES IN THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM, AND OTHER MATTERS, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 17 (Comm. Print 98-AA 1984).
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role in the rulemaking process, and in the case of one Department
of Agriculture program, simply took away OMB's power of review.65
As previously mentioned, the Administration's efforts to institution-
alize OMB review in the Omnibus Regulatory Reform legislation66
failed in the House of Respresentatives, in part because of congres-
sional doubts about that review process.6 7
The Supreme Court also struck an early blow at the Administra-
tion's reform efforts by holding that Congress did not intend to per-
mit OSHA to employ cost-benefit analysis in setting health
standards. 68 The Court later found that the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration's initial effort to repeal its passive restraint
standard was "arbitrary and capricious. '"69 In the latter case, the
Supreme Court further warned that future deregulatory efforts
would face the same "hard look" in reviewing courts as initial
rulemaking.
VI. CONCLUSION
What accounts for this astonishing defeat of a major policy initi-
ative of a popular Presidency? Why have the efforts that were near-
est and dearest to the hearts of the regulatory reformers incoming
in 1981 not become institutionalized, as have the goals of earlier
reform movements?
One explanation is that the Reagan Administration simply blew
it. It assigned to ideologues lacking in political savvy the task of
institutionalizing regulatory reform. During the early months of the
Administration when large legislative victories were possible, the
politically more astute policy officials in the White House were pre-
occupied with the budget, while regulatory reform languished on
the back burner. The thrust of this argument is that the Administra-
tion's regulatory reform efforts failed because they were too brash
and too obviously one-sided. As a result, politically skillful activist
groups seized the initiative and redefined the issue from "govern-
ment overreaching" to "abuse of trust."
Under this view, the Administration has lost the first foray, but
65. See Inside the Administration, September 7, 1984, at 3.
66. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 7938 (1981).
67. SUBCOMMITTEE ON RULES OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 97TH CONG., IST
SESS., BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON REGULATORY REFORM AND CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW
OF AGENCY RULES 6-7 (Comm. Print 1981).
68. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 514-23 (1981).
69. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Casualty Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46
(1983).
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can still win the war during the remainder of its tenure. Many regu-
latory reformers believe that the public still desires a relatively radi-
cal shift in the substantive goals for regulation and a gradual
dismantling of many of the institutional structures that are the leg-
acy of earlier reform movements.70 If the job is approached in a
more politically astute fashion, the new "regulatory relief" team of
the second Reagan Administration can accomplish lasting regula-
tory reform.
While I think that a great deal can be said for in this view, I
believe that it misreads the public mood on the issue of regulatory
reform, insofar as one can speak of a public mood in this fractious,
pluralistic nation. I believe the calls for regulatory reform in the late
1970s and early 1980s reflected a genuine feeling that the means that
agencies used to implement the social reform legislation of the late
1960s and early 1970s had become too intrusive.7' I do not believe,
however, that the public desired dramatic departures from the goals
of the earlier reform legislation. The earlier social reform legisla-
tion was meant to protect individual members of the public from
fraud and manipulation, from unnecessary risks to their health and
well being, and from irrational discrimination. While most people
probably believe that these goals can be achieved in a more efficient
and effective fashion, I do not believe that they want to depart from
the goals themselves. 72 Nor do I believe that they want to temper
those goals greatly with other considerations, such as the costs that
achieving them might place on the regulated industries.
In short, I do not believe that the regulatory reform movement
is a strong social movement, like those that resulted in the enact-
ment of earlier social legislation. Rather, it is a reaction to those
earlier movements and a signal to the agencies not to overdo it.
The public wants more intelligent, not less, regulation-regulatory
reform, not regulatory relief.
70. Christopher De Muth, Regulatory Chief, OMB, recommended that during 1984
the Administration consider reform of basic regulatory laws including the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act and environmental laws. Inside the Administration, Feb. 10, 1984, at
1.
71. Cf. G. EADS & M. Fix, supra note 1, at 92-95 (critics of regulation as a tool of
social control also raised arguments based on the apparent inability of regulations to
alter behavior and the difficulty of fulfilling the vast information requirements of
regulation).
72. See also id. at 254-55 (in 1983, EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus admitted that his
predecessor "had 'confused' the public's wish to improve the way in which government
protects the environment and public health with the Administration's own desire to
change the goals").
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Under this latter reading of the public mood, the Reagan Ad-
ministration has achieved some important successes, despite the
general defeat that it suffered on the regulatory relief front. It has
successfully implemented a device for screening government infor-
mation requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act.73
Although reasonable minds may differ at the margin, most people
believe that many government paperwork requirements were unjus-
tified and needed closer scrutiny.
Perhaps the most successful regulatory reform of the first Rea-
gan term was the institutionalization of the regulatory analysis pro-
cess. Although that process had its origin in the Ford
Administration and was considerably refined during the Carter Ad-
ministration, the Reagan Administration institutionalized it by en-
suring that every regulatory agency had on board personnel with
regulatory analysis capabilities. These "institutional skeptics" ask
hard questions about the need for regulatory requirements, and
then make the social costs of various regulatory options clear to the
regulators. Regulatory analysis can lead to more intelligent regula-
tion and can help ensure that current social goals are achieved as
efficiently as possible.
The regulatory analysis reforms, however, may bear the seeds
of their own destruction. Regulatory analysis can be pushed past its
natural limitations. There is a great tendency among economists
and policy analysts to attempt to quantify every conceivable variable
and to ignore those that cannot be quantified. Policy analysis can
also turn on hidden assumptions about how society ought to be ar-
ranged that are not immediately apparent to agency decisionmakers
and the public.
Because regulatory analysis is a very inexact art, it can be
manipulated toward substantive ends. There is strong evidence, for
example, that OMB has attempted to exploit its role in reviewing
regulatory analysis in order to influence the substantive nature of
the rules that it reviews.74 While this approach is entirely consistent
with OMB's accountability function, it can be very destructive of the
agencies' analytical efforts. When, as is currently the case, the policy
analysts in the agencies believe that a good analysis will earn bad
marks in OMB if it supports a substantive result that OMB dislikes,
then there is little incentive to do the kind of objective analysis that
73. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982).
74. Hall Hearings, supra note 11, at 429 (statement of Edward Durkin, Food and Bev-
erage Trades Department, AFL-CIO).
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can be of real aid to good faith upper level decisionmaking. If the
Administration is truly committed to regulatory analysis as a tool for
cognitive regulatory reform, it must take care not to destroy the
credibility of regulatory analysis by using it as a 'covert vehicle for
goal-oriented substantive regulatory reform.
The regulatory reform efforts of the Reagan Administration
also have implications for administrative lawyers. First, the events
of the first Reagan Administration have demonstrated that the jobs
of administrative lawyers are not in jeopardy. Their skills are still
needed. But if things go as I have predicted, lawyers will have to
add to their statutory interpretation skills the ability to read and cri-
tique regulatory impact assessments. They will have to understand
and be able to communicate in the economists' jargon as well as the
technical jargon of the agencies with which they deal.75
In addition, the nature of the case that the lawyer must make
before the agency will change somewhat. Rather than making a
straightforward appeal that the regulatory option in the client's in-
terest also furthers the agency's statutory goals, the attorney must
now be prepared to argue that his or her client's approach is the one
that most effectively achieves those goals. Rather than launching blun-
derbuss attacks on every conceivable aspect of a proposed regula-
tion, lawyers will better serve their clients by suggesting less
expensive routes to the same substantive ends. In the process, the
lawyer must be prepared to demonstrate that the less expensive
route is also "enforceable." Lawyers may even come up with novel
enforcement devices-such as environmental audits, for example-
that will convince the agency to choose the less expensive route.
In sum, successful regulatory reform during the remainder of
the Reagan era will reflect a greater appreciation of the needs, per-
ceptions, and desires of the general public. And lawyers represent-
ing regulated industries before the administrative agencies, who can
expect a sympathetic ear from the upper level decisionmakers, will
find that finesse, not force, is the most effective strategy.
75. See generally B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 105-10 (1984) (warn-
ing that lawyers may lose social power to technocrats).
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